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ABSTRACT
Machine learning (ML) applications generate a continuous stream
of success stories from various domains. ML enables many novel
applications, also in a safety-related context. With the advent of
Autonomous Driving, ML gets used in automotive domain. In such
a context, ML-based systems are safety-related. In the automotive
industry, the applicable functional safety standard is ISO 26262,
which does not cover specific aspects of ML. In a safety-related
ML project, all ISO 26262 work products are typically necessary
and have to be delivered. However, specific aspects of ML (like
data set requirements, special analyses for ML) must be addressed
within some work products. In this paper, we propose how the key
technical aspects and supporting processes related to development
of ML-based systems can be organized according to ISO 26262
phases, sub-phases and work-products.
KEYWORDS
autonomous driving, automotive software, machine learning, de-
pendability, functional safety, ISO 26262, software engineering
1 INTRODUCTION
Along with utilizing machine learning (ML) algorithms the quality
of several non-safety related products has improved in the past
years. Capabilities of those algorithms to learn and work with
incomplete knowledge and their generalization capabilities make
them highly desirable solutions for complex problems that currently
may not even have well-known analytical solution. This has moti-
vated the introduction of ML techniques/components into products
from many industry domains including automotive systems.
In automotive industryML algorithms are the core of Autonomous
Driving as they allow to interpret and understand the surrounding
environment and make driving-related decisions. Such systems are
safety-related, since their malfunction may cause death or injury.
Therefore, deployment of ML algorithm into such applications must
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follow a rigorous development cycle according to state-of-art and
according to applicable safety standards. However, the use of ML
algorithms is not sufficiently covered by existing automotive safety
standards such as ISO 26262 [11] or Safety of the Intended Func-
tion (SOTIF) [12]. Even more, IEC 61508 [10] standard explicitly
recommends not to use artificial intelligence algorithms. For this
reason, existing safety standards and their verification/validation
techniques cannot be directly applied for ML algorithms, as they
do not properly address the special characteristics of ML-based
components such as non-determinism, non-transparency.
Automotive AD/ML projects are safety-related, thus ISO 26262
needs to be followed, both at the process level (e.g. change man-
agement, configuration management) and technical level (e.g. how
to build and verify safe software or hardware). ISO 26262 defines
a well-known structure/framework for safety-related automotive
projects. All ISO 26262 work products are to be provided, but some
of them need to be extended to cover specific aspects of ML/AD (e.g.
datasets requirements, special analyses for ML, SOTIF/SAE at item
level). Moreover, also integration of various software components
is needed (e.g. standard C-implemented components and ML code).
At this moment, academic approaches do not provide a com-
plete solution to the lack of understandability of ML algorithms,
including deep neural networks [9]. Moreover, academic work typ-
ically focuses on performance issues and ignores safety aspects
in work (e.g. such us potential failure modes and safety measures
that could mitigate potential faults of algorithms and data). Ad-
ditionally, the whole life cycle of the ML algorithm development
(e.g. including data collection, labeling process, algorithms design
and development) is not taken into account. For example, together
with one of the most popular dataset KITTI 3D object detection [7],
the authors provide a benchmark that ranks object detection algo-
rithms according to the average precision metric. The researchers
that published their ML-based solutions focused only on this sin-
gle evaluation metric, whereas some of current limitations of the
published algorithms might be caused by insufficient quality of the
objects’ labeling, e.g. missing objects annotations, improper train-
ing and testing datasets data distribution or insufficient parameters
optimization. Complete analysis of the whole life cycle of a con-
crete ML component from item-level hazard analysis to deployment
of binary code on a hardware platform exceeds resources of any
academic research group. For instance, in [31] the authors to this
date identified 1470 individual hazards that could affect computer
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vision algorithms. Coverage of these hazards by the test dataset,
definition of safety mechanisms that will mitigate these hazards
and integration of these mechanisms into the developed algorithm
is required in order to eliminate long-term risks or mitigate them to
the acceptable level. Such activities are resource-consuming and po-
tential exhaustive tackling of them is even beyond the capabilities
of existing manufacturers and requires a consolidated cooperation
between automotive industry and academia.
The main goal of this paper is to propose how development pro-
cess of ML-based components can be oriented towards well-known
ISO 26262 practices that have been utilized for years, instead of cre-
ating a completely new standard not yet exposed to the automotive
industry. In this work, we present how ML based components can
be integrated into currently defined work products in ISO 26262
starting from item definition and finishing on safety validation. To
simplify the general understanding of our proposal, we present a
simplified example of a road line detection.
This document shall provide guidance by addressing technical
key aspects related to the development of ML-based systems. A
manufacturer will very likely have to be able to present and argue
these essential aspects during an assessment and provide evidence
that their system is safe. However, this document is not intended
to provide detailed guidance on all aspects of a safety lifecycle and
therefore by nature is not entirely complete. It only points out main
objectives.
The paper is structured as follows: section II describes the ex-
isting automotive standards and existing work in which authors
discuss how to ensure safety and use ML in automotive industry.
Section III presents our proposal on how ISO 26262 could be ap-
plied to an autonomous vehicle that utilizes a machine learning
algorithm to provide a certain safety-related functionality. It is also
pointed out which work products defined in ISO 26262 require a
special attention when a vehicle is extended with a new item that
uses ML. Finally, the conclusions are given in Section IV.
2 RELATEDWORK AND EXISTING
STANDARDS
Themain purpose of ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF) is to cover a foreseeable
misuse of a system by a driver, as well as the system/technological
shortcomings of a product. Malfunctions of E/E components are
addressed by ISO 26262 standard. The risk coming from a deliberate
impact is covered by security stanard ISO/SAE 21434. Organiz-
ing a development process as per ISO/PAS 21448, ISO 26262 and
ISO/SAE 21434 and utilizing their well-established global state-of-
art practices is a key to achieve a safe/secure/dependable ML-based
autonomous system.
The ISO has recently created a new technical subcommittee
(ISO/JTC 1 SC 42) that is to operate in the area of artificial intel-
ligence. Scope of work covers fundamental standards as well as
issues related to safety and trustworthiness [19].
Salay et al. analyze ISO 26262 from an ML perspective and they
discuss five topics that should be addressed in development of ML
based components such as: new types of hazards specific for ML and
new types of faults and failure modes, usage of incomplete training
datasets, level on which ML algorithms should be used, and which
software techniques should be required in their verification [21, 23].
They also analyzed software verification methods recommended
by ISO 26262 and concluded that most of verification techniques
can by directly applied or adopted for ML algorithms.
Cheng et al. introduced a novel tool called the NN-Dependa-
bility Kit to support safe design and development of deep neural
networks (DNN) for autonomous driving systems [4]. This tool
offers several state-of-the-art techniques that could improve safety
engineering of DNN including dependability metrics, techniques
for ensuring that the generalization does not lead to undesired
behaviors and runtime monitoring methods.
Henriksson et al. proposed that the ML component can be re-
alized as a software unit on the software level phase and discuss
the most critical gaps between ISO 26262 and ML development [8].
Additionally, they propose three adaptations related to ML training,
model sensitivity, and test case design that are crucial to develop
ML based components according to the ISO 26262.
Molina et al. proposed to implement an independent module -the
Autonomous Vehicle Control (AVC)- that is going to both interact
with the vehicle’s systems and create a protection layer that is
independent of the way the vehicle’s system was developed. So, the
AVC could be used with any autonomous vehicle system and could
be tested individually [17].
Koopman et al. proposed to introduce a novel Standard for Safety
for the Evaluation of Autonomous Products (UL 4600) that is in-
tended to cover autonomous driving and eventually other related
domains [14].
Spanfelner et al. [25] highlighted that perception functionality
for autonomous driving may not be completely specifiable and
human categories (e.g., pedestrians) can only partially be speci-
fied using rules (e.g., necessary and sufficient conditions) and also
need examples. This topic has also been addressed in [22], where
authors proposed to use partial specifications instead of complete
specifications, which are difficult or impossible to specify precisely.
Another interesting overview of problems related to application
of ML methods in autonomous driving was presented in the white
paper called Safety First for Automated Driving (SaFAD) [26]. This
technical report was released by 11 automotive companies and key
technology providers, the authors presented the summary how to
develop and validate a safe automated driving system. They also
proposed to divide the development of ML components into four
steps define, specify, develop & evaluate and deploy & monitor.
3 PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF ML-BASED
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AS PER ISO
26262
Providing a dedicated standard that is sufficiently detailed in ad-
dressing crucial aspects of design and verification for application
of ML algorithms in the automotive domain would require a lot of
work and time for its creation, careful review process and reaching
an agreement across the whole safety experts community. In this
work, instead of delivering a stand-alone standard, we propose a
comprehensive solution that is aligned to the well-know and widely
applied ISO 26262.
We recommend this approach due to following reasons:
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3-5.5.1 Item definition
3-5 Item definition
3-6.5.1 HARA report
3-6.5.2 Verification report of the HARA
3-6 Hazard analysis and risk assessment
3-7.5.1 Functional safety concept (FSC)
3-7.5.2 Verification report of the FSC
3-7 Functional safety concept
4-6.5.1 Technical safety requirements specification
4-6.5.2 Technical safety concept
4-6.5.3 System architectural design specification
4-6.5.4 HW-SW interface specification
4-6.5.7 Safety analyses report
4-6 Technical safety concept
6-5.5.1 Documentation of the software development environment
6-5 General topics for the product development
6-6.5.1 SW safety requirements specification
6-6.5.2 HW-SW interface specification
6-6.5.3 SW verification report
6-6 Specification of SW safety requirements
6-7.5.1 SW architectural design specification
6-7.5.2 Safety analysis report
6-7.5.3 Dependent failures analysis report
6-7.5.4 SW verification report
6-7 SW architectural design
6-8.5.1 SW unit design specification
6-8.5.2 SW unit implementation
6-8 SW unit design and implementation
6-9.5.1 Software verification specification
6-9.5.2 Software verification report
6-9 Software unit verification
6-10.5.1 SW verification specification
6-10.5.2 Embedded SW
6-10.5.3 SW verification report
6-10 SW integration and testing
6-11.5.1 SW verification specification
6-11.5.2 SW verification report
6-11 Testing of embedded software
4-7.5.1 Integration and test strategy
4-7.5.2 Integration and test report
4-7 System and item integration and testing
4-8.5.1 Safety validation specification
4-8.5.2 Safety validation report
4-8 Safety validation
7-7.5.1 Field observation instructions
7-7 Operation, service and decommissioning
8-8.5.1 Change management plan
8-8 Change management
8-11.5.1 Software tool criteria evaluation report
8-11.5.2 Software tool qualification report
8-11 Confidence in the use of software tools
Figure 1: The V-model used in ISO 26262 software development
• ISO 26262 is a well established standard with well defined
terminology and has been used by automotive industry and
functional safety engineers since 2011,
• components that use ML algorithms are specific software
modules that interface with other safety-related software
components and run on safety-related hardware compo-
nents, thus they have to be designed, integrated, validated
and tested with other components according to the ISO
26262,
• even if components that use ML algorithms are crucial for
perception functionality in autonomous driving, this is just
one of many vehicle functions,
• ISO 26262 does not provide detailed information how to
define requirements for concrete functionalities, e.g. it is not
specified how to provide a safe persistent storage or safe
CPU. Therefore, this is compliant with our approach, as we
do not provide a detailed guidance on ML,
• a detailed guidance and good practices recommended to ML
can be defined in separate documents as ISO 26262 does not
provide any methodology how to achieve the required rigour
level,
• ISO 26262 leaves a lot for interpretation, especially with
regard to the used technology or it refers to test methods
without defining them in details, e.g. fault injection test,
• working according to V-model defined in ISO 26262 allows
to achieve wide-range and bidirectional traceability across
item-level hazard analysis to deployment of binary code on
hardware platform.
The autonomous driving system in general consists of four mod-
ules responsible for: data acquisition (sensors), perception, route
planning and steering. ML algorithms are a core of perception mod-
ule, in which raw information from sensors are transformed into
worthwhile information. The remaining modules that are included
in an autonomous driving functionality can be development as
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SOTIF-based system properties for the item
3-5 Item definition
HARA for ML
Safety goals for ML
3-6 Hazard analysis and risk
Functional safety requirements for ML
3-7 Functional safety concept
Technical safety requirements for ML
Technical safety concept for ML
System architectural for ML
Safety analyses report for ML
4-6 Technical safety concept
DATASET: dataset and labelling policy specification and review
MODEL: requirements and review for ML algorithm(s),
KPI and runtime monitoring specification and review
6-6 Specification of software safety requirements
DATASET: architectural design of dataset and labelling policy
MODEL: architectural design of ML algorithm(s) for host and target
architectural design of KPI and runtime monitoring
integration with rest of software
6-7 Software architectural design
DATASET: dataset gathering and labelling
MODEL: implementation of host and target models
implementation of host and target frameworks
implementation of KPI and runtime monitoring
training and validation, parameters optimization
6-8 Software unit design and implementation
DATASET: dataset labelling quality of the verification specification and report
MODEL: training and validation verification specification and report
back-to-back testing between target model and host model
testing performance/generalization of the elementary models using KPI
testing runtime monitoring
6-9 Software unit verification
DATASET: verification of the consistency between subsets of annotations
MODEL: integration of ML networks into bigger ones
testing of integrated ML models using KPI and runtime monitoring
6-10 Software integration and testing
DATASET: dataset completeness, coverage and equivalence classes
MODEL: E2E-testing of entire software
testing if ML component fulfils the SSRs on the target vehicle
testing runtime monitoring
6-11 Testing of embedded software
HW-SW testing/integration on target vehicle
4-7 System and item integration and testing
Specification of the road test
Execution of road tests
4-8 Safety validation
Selection of the ML development environment (ML frameworks and tools for simulation and testing)
6-5 General topics for the product development
Continuous monitoring of anomalies in ML-based system
7-7 Operation, service and decommissioning
Change management for continous delivery
8-8 Change management
Evaluation of TCL for ML lools Qualification of specific ML tools
8-11 Confidence in the use of software tools
Figure 2: ISO 26262 sub-phases and work products that need to modified during ML based component development.
classical components that can be directly designed and developed
according to ISO 26262.
The life-cycle of the product development defined in ISO 26262
standard is divided into phases and sub-phases for which the re-
quired output work products are defined. In this section, it is pointed
out which sub-phases and work products are affected when ML-
based components are to be used in a vehicle (using standard des-
ignations of ISO 26262 work products) and how a development of
a ML-based component for autonomous driving could be incor-
porated into the V-model proposed in ISO 26262. Additionally, to
simplify reading and understanding, we provided a part of exem-
plary analysis for road line detection and we mentioned the main
problems that should be addressed in the respective work products.
In the scope of this work, we focus on supervised learning and
deep neural networks as it is generally reported that they achieve
superior performance in many computer vision tasks related to
autonomous driving [1, 24, 27]. This document does not address
problems related to the development of end-to-end learning [2]
components, in which DNN are trained on raw sensors data to
directly perform steering of the vehicle.
3 - Concept phase
3-5 Item definition
3-5.5.1 Item definition
The objective of this work product is to define properties of the
ML-based item equipped at the vehicle and Operational Design
Domain (ODD), in which the Autonomous Driving functionality
is designed to properly operate (i.e. environmental conditions,
background scene, geographic domain, speed limit, etc.). It also
needs to address SAE J3016 [20] standard by identifying the
automation level.
EXAMPLE
ITEM: SAE L3 highway pilot.
VEHICLE FUNCTION: vehicle shall keep the lane on a highway
without lane changing.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM: Data from radars, lidars and
cameras will be used to control engine, brakes and steering.
ODD: driving on a dry highway without rain or snow during
daylight with max. speed limit of 120 km/h.
3-6 Hazard analysis and risk assessment
3-6.5.1 Hazard analysis and risk assessment report
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The objective of this work product is to define new types of
hazards covering functional limitations of ML-based components
and related safety goals.
EXAMPLE
HAZARD: highway pilot incorrectly localized road lines due to
model limitations, e.g. new pattern.
SAFETY GOAL: Prevent crossing the lane.
A good point to start a collection of hazards specific for computer
vision domain was introduced in [31].
3-7 Functional safety concept
3-7.5.1 Functional safety concept
The objective of this work product is to define high-level require-
ments that are specific for ML components to control of relevant
faults in accordance with its safety goals and assign them to the
respective elements in the system architectural design.
EXAMPLE
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS: The vehicle shall
recognize road lines and environment according to the defined
evaluation criteria.
ALLOCATION TO ELEMENT: Allocated to sensing subsystem
and brain ECU.
4 - Productdevelopmentatthe systemlevel
4-6 Technical safety concept
4-6.5.1 Technical safety reqirements specification
The objective of this work product is to define technical safety
requirements that specify how to achieve safe execution of ML-
based components.
EXAMPLE
Camera ECU shall receive raw data from camera sensor, it shall
convert, filter, process it and it shall provide it periodically every
10ms over Ethernet to brain ECU that realize the perception
functionality.
4-6.5.2 Technical safety concept
The objective of this work product is to define technical safety
concept that provides an how system architectural design fulfills
safety requirements, considering known limitations of ML.
EXAMPLE
Road lines shall be localized using two diverse ML algorithms
that use a camera. The first method shall work on SoC with
GPU, the latter shall work on CPU and voting should be applied
between results of both algorithms.
4-6.5.3 System architectural design specification
The objective of this work product is to define system architec-
tural design that shall realize the technical safety requirements,
considering known limitations of ML algorithms.
EXAMPLE
Data provided from lidar sensors shall be in the format of a
point cloud.
4-6.5.7 Safety analyses report
The objective of this work product is to provide a safety analysis
on the system level that verifies each system-level ML component
and which demonstrates the independence between independent
elements.
EXAMPLE
Both ML components use similar DNN and were trained on
the same training dataset and their level of diversity may be
insufficient, therefore it is recommended to replace one DNN
by other type of DNN or classical ML algorithm.
4-7 System and item integration and testing
4-7.5.1 Integration and test strategy
The objective of this work product is to define amethodology/approach
how to test on the target vehicle against technical safety con-
cept considering known limitations of components that used ML
algorithms.
EXAMPLE
Extensive testing by injecting faults to input for one of SoC to
verify if that is detected by the voter defined in TSC.
Extensive testing by providing generated and real images/scenes
to the brain ECU.
4-7.5.2 Integration and test report
The objective of this work product is to provide test specifica-
tions and a report that covers hardware-software integration and
testing as well as integration of individual elements of the system
on the target vehicle according to the defined specification.
EXAMPLE
Extensive tests can find that some objects are not known to
Brain ECU.
4-8 Safety validation
4-8.5.1 Safety validation specification including safety validation
environment description
The objective of this work product is to specify ML/AD-related
road tests addressing and providing argumentation about their
coverage and completeness in the context of known limitations
of ML. In the scope of this paper, we do not provide a guidance
how this road tests should be defined and how to verify their
coverage, but we only argue that this can be done in this work
product. Challenges and limitations of road testing are extensively
discussed in [15, 16].
EXAMPLE
Autonomous vehicle shall be tested on the highway in the de-
fined ODD.
4-8.5.2 Safety validation report resulting from re-
qirements
The objective of this work product is to perform the specified
road tests, report the results and make decision if the current
version of the product ensures expected level of safety.
EXAMPLE
Current version of the highway pilot doesn’t recognize bad
weather conditions and allows you to enable the autopilot if the
weather conditions are not fulfilled.
6 - Product development at the software
level
6-5 General topics for the product develop-
ment at the software level
6-5.5.1 Documentationofthe softwaredevelopment
environment
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The objective of this work product is to select the ML develop-
ment environment and its configuration.
EXAMPLE
Selected DNN for road lines detection shall be implemented
in Tensorflow framework. The training of the model shall use
Python and the runtime model shall be developed in C++.
6-6 Specification of software safety reqire-
ments
6-6.5.1 Software safety reqirements specification
The objective of this work product is to define general require-
ments for selected ML algorithm for the dataset. This work prod-
uct should cover the following aspects:
• specification of the dataset (how much data, what type of
data are needed (e.g. object classes, ODD, weather conditions,
geographic domain, background scene), how to split data into
training, validation and testing),
• specification of the labeling policy (how to annotate the data
e.g. how to deal with occluded objects, how many annotators
should annotate the same data),
• specification of KPIs for dataset (labeling quality evaluation,
dataset coverage, dataset distribution),
• specification for the ML algorithm (what type of algorithm
should be used, what exactly the algorithm should do, what
performance is required according to the defined KPI, what
are the computational complexity is required),
• requirements on KPIs for ML model (metrics to measure single
model performance e.g. average precision, measuring robust-
ness of the model against noise, data augmentation, adversarial
attacks, reproducibility of the results),
• requirements on runtime monitoring (metrics that will be run
on the target vehicle to prevent against potential failures e.g.
uncertainty metrics, recognition out-of-distribution data)
The scope of this work product probably will be one of the most
challenging due to the fact that our current knowledge about ML
and DNN is not yet sufficient. However, specific software safety
requirement related to ML algorithms and dataset can be included
as a part of this work product. The challenges and limitations
related to the dataset design and development were defined in
[30] and review of the algorithms related with perception in
autonomous driving was presented in [6].
EXAMPLE
DATASET: The dataset shall contain images gathered for differ-
ent type of roads at different weather conditions. The road line
boundaries shall be marked pixel by pixel. Each image should
be annotated by two independent annotators. The amount of
10% of randomly selected data shall be additionally annotated
by third annotator. The data acquisition shall take place at the
day time.
MODEL: Road lines detection should be performed by an al-
gorithm that uses deep neural network and classical computer
vision algorithm. Consistency between them should be mea-
sured according to the defined KPI.
6-6.5.3 Software verification report
The objective of this work product is to verify the requirements
defined in the previous work product. This review shall be made
jointly by persons responsible for the system, hardware and soft-
ware development and also ML engineering.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: During the review, it was determined that require-
ments:
– specify only one annotator for doing the annotation, which
is clearly insufficient.
– do not include acquiring images at night time.
– do not consider data acquisition at different weather condi-
tions.
– do not specify that verification of the dataset completeness
shall be performed by a different team than the data acquisi-
tion.
MODEL: Lack of argumentation for the algorithm selection
aspect was identified and this argumentation shall be provided.
6-7 Software architectural design
6-7.5.1 Softwarearchitecturaldesign specification
The objective of this work product is to design the software archi-
tecture for the used ML components including preprocessing of
the input data from sensors, selection of the ML algorithms and
data flow between them, and postprocessing of the outputs of
ML algorithms. It shall also define architectural design of the ML
model training, its integration with KPI to evaluate the perfor-
mance and robustness of the model during training. Additionally,
the architecture shall also address the problem of integration of
the ML model with runtime monitoring metrics, which allows to
supervise the ML models behaviour (e.g. analysis of the neuron
activation patterns [5] ) or correctness of the input data (e.g. using
Monte Carlo epistemic uncertainty to measure how the analyzed
sample is statistically similar to these samples that were used in
the training dataset [13]) at inference time.
This part should also cover architectural design of the dataset
development process and specify how the data should be recorded,
collected and annotated (format of the data, compression, labels
specification). The problem of architectural design definition for
data gathering and labeling process is typically neglected, but in
our opinion these steps shall be considered as a part of the product
development. One of the possible approaches for handling these
aspects could be using active learning [3, 18] in the development
life cycle to label only these data samples for which it is expected
that they improve quality of the model or to tune the model to
deal with edge cases that were not recognized during the tests.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: Road line boundaries annotations shall be stored as
xml files separate for each input image. The bounding box spec-
ification shall define coordinates as [ymin ,xmin ,ymax ,xmax ]
format, where y and x are corresponding to the bounding box
height and width measured in pixels.
MODEL: Road lines shall be localized using LaneNet network
[28] and Canny detector [29] and consistency between them
should be measured according to the defined KPI to verify if
road lines were annotated correctly.
6-7.5.2 Safety analysis report
The objective of this work product is to perform safety analysis
tailored for ML to confirm that all software safety requirements
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are fulfilled and the all safety-related parts of the software were
identified. In scope of this work product safety measures shall
specified to mitigate potential failures related to ML. Additionally,
it should deliver the definition of verification criteria to confirm
effectiveness of designed safety measures.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: Incorrect road line annotation could lead to decrease
of the final model performance.
MODEL: A corrupted input image provided by a software com-
munication layer to the DNN could cause similar effect to the
adversarial attack on the model.
6-7.5.3 Dependent failures analysis report
The objective of this work product is to analyze if the implementa-
tion of software safety requirements defined for ML components
ensures independence or freedom from interference and how
possible dependent failures can be mitigated.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: It was identified that the second set of annotation
was prepared by translating the first set of annotations by a
constant offset, so that it is doubtful that both annotations set
were prepared independently.
MODEL: Two models use the same input camera sensor and
therefore corruption of that sensor might cause a failure of both
DNNs. Both algorithms are developed using the same ML frame-
work and thus the achieved the level of diversity is not sufficient
(e.g. due to a potential systematic fault in the implementation
of a certain DNN layer that is commonly used).
6-7.5.4 Software verification report
The objective of this work product is to verify the correctness
of the developed software architectural design and provide the
evidence that it fulfills software safety requirements considering
known limitations of ML.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: The performed inspection of the architectural design
confirmed that it fulfills all software safety requirements.
MODEL: The performed inspection revealed that the connec-
tion between epistemic uncertainty estimation and the runtime
model is not yet defined.
6-8 Software unit design and implementation
6-8.5.1 Software unit design specification
The objective of this work product is to specify the functional
behaviour and the detailed information that are necessary for
implementation of ML algorithms and KPIs and runtime monitor-
ing. It comprises unit design of the host and target frameworks
(that are typically preexisting). It should also include all internal
models’ parameters and hyperparameters and their optimization
during the training and validation steps. This part should be
continued until the models achieve the expected effectiveness.
Finally, the output of this work product should be frozen models
(e.g. a deep neural networks with the weights), which will be not
changed or modified anymore.
This part also shall cover the data acquisition and annotation
process. As was discussed for software architectural design, in
our opinion it is crucial to include dataset development to the
V-model defined in ISO 26262 to define and implement how the
process of data collection is integrated with the training of the
model. The output of this work product shall be a dataset with
annotations that are divided into training, validation and testing
subsets.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: 60% of the gathered data shall used as the training,
20% as validation and 20% as testing.
MODEL: The host model shall be implemented using Tensor-
Flow framework. The target model shall be generated from the
host model and executed via dedicated execution environment.
The optimal parameters and hyperparameters defined for the
LaneNet model shall be established in training and validation
process to fulfill defined values of KPI considering robustness of
the model against data augmentation, impact of different noise
models and adversarial attacks.
6-8.5.2 Software unit implementation
The objective of this work product is to implement the required
ML algorithms (both host and target), perform training and vali-
dation of the selected models, optimize their internal parameters
and evaluate of KPI and runtime monitoring metrics. In this part
the data shall be gathered and annotated. The results of this step
shall be frozen ML models that are not to be changed in software
unit testing. Obviously, until a subset of the annotated data is not
provided, it is not possible to start the training of the models, but
it could be realized as iterative and parallel process while more
and more data samples are acquired and labeled.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: Gathering and annotation process of the images with
road lines.
MODEL: Implementation, training and validation of the LaneNet
network to correctly detect the road line according to the defined
KPI. Generation of the target model from the host model.
6-9 Software unit verification
6-9.5.1 Software verification specification
The objective of this work product is to specify how to test the
final model on the test dataset and according to which metrics
to achieve the expected performance. This work product shall
also specify how the quality of the labeling process should be
verified.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: 20% of the data shall be send to other supplier to
check if all road lines were annotated correctly.
MODEL: To evaluate the reproducibility of the model, the 10
independent LaneNet models shall be tested.
6-9.5.2 Software verification report
The objective of this work product is to test frozen models (ob-
tained during the training phase) on the test dataset according
to the defined KPI, measuring the performance of implemented
runtime monitors and perform standard verification testing rec-
ommended by ISO 26262. In the scope of this paper, we do not
discuss which testing techniques that are applicable to ML algo-
rithm, but we would like to address that this verification should
be applied in this work product on the model that were obtained
after the training process was finished. Additional important part
of this work product is also back-to-back testing between training
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model and runtime model. This work product shall also cover
verification of the quality of the labelling process. Finally, this
work product shall also cover whether the quality of the dataset
labelling meets the defined requirements.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: Verification if the road line boundaries were anno-
tated pixel-by-pixel.
MODEL: Verification if defined runtime monitors are able to
identify so called edge cases that could cause incorrect output
from the network (e.g. highway pilot is not designed to work
during the rain, but designed runtime monitor incorrectly rec-
ognize ODD).
6-10 Software integration and verification
6-10.5.1 Softwareverification specification (refined)
The objective of this work product is to specify how to test the
wider scope of the system with both ML networks integrated
according to selected KPI and runtime monitoring metrics. This
work product shall also specify how to verify the consistency
between two subsets of annotations provided by independent
annotators or suppliers.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: Consistency between two independent road line
annotations obtained from different suppliers shall be evaluated
by calculating inter-annotator variance.
MODEL: Performance of the two integrated road lines detectors:
the LaneNet network and Canny edge detector shall be evaluated
according to defined KPI and runtime monitors.
6-10.5.2 Embedded software
The objective of this work product is to define the steps that are
required to integrate ML models implemented at software unit
design level into bigger ones. Considering the dataset, in this work
package, it should be defined how to integrate the annotations
that were generated from many annotators or suppliers and what
kind of voting model is to be utilized.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: The coordinates of the manually labelled road lines
generated by two annotators shall be averaged.
MODEL: A voter should check whether a designated road lane
was based on road lines detected on at least one model.
6-10.5.3 Software verification report (refined)
The objective of this work product is to test the performance
of the integrated ML models according to the defined KPI and
runtime monitors. Additionally, if the datset annotations were
prepared by independent annotators or suppliers then this work
product shall also provide a consistency verification report. Fi-
nally, this work product should give the answer if the consistency
between dataset labelling annotations and integrated ML mod-
els is sufficient or the software architectural design should be
updated.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: A report from evaluation of the consistency of two
subsets of annotations provided by two independent suppliers.
MODEL: A report that summarizes performance the integrated
road line detection models: LaneNet and Canny edge detector.
6-11 Testing of the embedded software
6-11.5.1 Softwareverification specification (refined)
The objective of this work product is to specify the testing of
entire software including runtime monitoring on the target vehi-
cle. This part shall also define criteria to test whether developed
ML component fulfils the software safety requirements on the
target vehicle. Additionally, this part shall define how to test
if all software safety requirements defined for the datset were
fulfilled. Finally, this work product shall specify how to test the
integration of the whole process of data collection, labeling and
training of a new model in case runtime monitors detect edge
cases that were incorrectly recognized by currently developed
ML component.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: Specification how to test if dataset consists of the
images gathered in winter conditions.
MODEL: Specification of E2E testing of the road line detection
component.
6-11.5.2 Software verification report (refined)
The objective of this work product is to perform the final tests
of ML based component and annotated dataset according to the
specification defined in the software verification specification
to finally confirm that they fulfill all allocated software safety
requirements.
EXAMPLE
DATASET: The road lines detection dataset is not complete,
because it does not contain example of highway roads recorded
during winter conditions and it shall be updated.
MODEL: The used runtime monitor designed for road line de-
tection component is not able to identify winter condition and
allows to turn on highway autopilot in winter conditions.
7 - Operation, service and decommissioning
7-7 Operation, service and decommissioning
7-7.5.1 Field observation instructions
The objective of this work product is to perform a continuous
monitoring of released vehicles after the start of production. A
field monitoring process shall be available that allows for a pos-
sibility to detect outdated ML-models or anomalies (e.g. out-of-
distribution detection) and the reaction on defined trigger events
for (planned) evolutionary updates over the whole safety lifecy-
cle. The field monitoring process shall especially be planned to
determine what, when, by whom and how often data shall be pro-
cessed and updated. Field monitoring and change management
shall be closely interconnected.
EXAMPLE
The out-of-distribution detection running in a vehicle detects
anomalous events that require a degradation of the ML-based
function.
8 - Supporting processes
8-8 Change Management
8-8.5.1 Change management plan
The objective of this work product is to specify a change man-
agement plan that applies for a project that is under continous
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delivery (rather than when there is just one delivery - start of pro-
duction). ML-based systems will very likely have to be updated
continuously over the product lifetime. The change management
planning therefore shall consider all foreseeable trigger events
that possibly imply a change, such as explicitly planned contin-
uous changes, changes necessary due to detected anomalies or
due to the aging of demands. This analysis and planning activity
shall be performed at an early stage of the development. Having a
mature change management planning available will be essential
to automate activities by incorporating the backend tool chain.
EXAMPLE
Aging of demands: Due to a change in legislation, new test cases
are mandatory which leads to an update (re-training) of the
ML-based system.
8-11 Confidence in the use of software tools
8-11.5.1 Software tool criteria evaluation report
The objective of this work product is to evaluate the impact
of the ML tools, used during the development process, on the
released product. In a ML-based project, the ML-tools are more
complex than in C development. Secondly, the errors that they
introduce (e.g. generators, training) or errors that they detect
(ML simulation or testing tools) are hard to be detected by other
means, so potentially there is a risk of having several complex
tools that have a Tool Confidence Level of 2 or 3.
EXAMPLE
Because of usage of two diverse development frameworks (Py-
Torch and TensorFlow) and due to testing of the learned net-
works, the frameworks (running at host only) are classified as
TCL1.
8-11.5.2 Software toolqalification report
The objective of this work product is to perform a safety-qualification
of ML tools. Such tools are complex, they are not developped
according to safety standards.
EXAMPLE
A selected TCL2 test framework has a good scrum-based devel-
opment process, the software is deployed in thousands of hosts
in the evaluated major version, there are extensive unit tests
for the tool as well as an independently developed validation
test framework covering all safety-related features of the tool,
which all allows to achieve TCL2 for this tool.
Defining the whole process according to the workflow proposed
by ISO 26262 makes it possible to easily trace potential failures
and limitations in the product development. For instance, in the
considered example of a road lane detection, we can discover that
the currently used algorithm is not able to correctly detect a road
line if it is not marked by white lines, because the acquired dataset
does not contain such type of data in the training part.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose how the ML based components can be
currently developed according to the ISO 26262 standard. Our work
is mainly motivated by the fact that still there is a lack of dedicated
standard that covers issues related to the design and development
of ML based components in road vehicles.
By this work we also try to prove that design and development
after some adaptations can be started based on existing version of
the standard. Defining the whole process according to the workflow
proposed by ISO 26262 makes it possible to easily trace potential
failures and limitations in the design and development process
of autonomous driving and can be applied immediately before
a dedicated standard is be developed. We believe that our work
will be a contribution to further progress in application of ML in
automotive industry.
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